N Bengal train accident was waiting to happen: CRS report
Times of India | 17 July 2024
Kolkata/New Delhi: Commission of Railway Safety (CRS), in its provisional findings in the fatal Kanchanjungha Express accident on June 17, has pointed to wrong authority letters issued to loco pilots on how to negotiate defective signals and lapses at "multiple levels" in train operations following failure of automatic signals, terming it an accident "waiting to happen".
The report also virtually exonerates goods train loco pilot Amit Kumar, who was killed in the accident.
Immediately after the accident, Railway Board chairperson Jaya Verma Sinha had claimed that Kumar had disregarded signals, and this had led to the accident that killed 10 and injured 43.
The report by Janak Kumar Garg, North-East Frontier Railway's chief commissioner of railway safety (CCRS), points a finger at ambiguity in rules to be followed in cases of failure of automatic signals (which was the case that day), senior authorities in Katihar division and the Rangapani stationmaster.
The report claims that two trains were allowed into a section with signalling failure, when only one should have been allowed. It also mentions that the loco pilots had been issued "incorrect memos", which left them confused.
The report corroborates what TOI had reported in a series of investigative articles following the accident, after speaking to serving and retired railway officials and All-India Railwaymen's Federation assistant general secretary Amit Kumar Ghosh.
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The CRS said the ‘paper authority' issued to loco pilots of trains operating between Rangapani and Chatterhat on that day when automatic signals had failed did not mention the speed limit that drivers were supposed to follow while crossing defective signals. Also, the loco pilot and the train manager were not provided with walkie-talkies, which could have ensured better communication. The report points out that officials should have treated the signalling failure — reported at 5.50am — as a "major signal failure" and followed the ‘automatic Block System (ABS)'. Under this system, only one train is allowed to enter between two stations and, until the proceeding train crosses the next station, no other train is permitted to enter beyond the first station.
In this case, not declaring ABS meant the stationmaster at Rangapani had allowed the freight train to enter the section without confirming with the Chatterhat stationmaster whether Kanchanjungha Express had crossed. The Rangapani stationmaster also issued the wrong authority or memo (T/A 912, which does not have any speed restrictions, instead of T/B 912, which limits speed to 25kmph) to the loco pilots of the two trains involved in the accident, as well as five other trains that had preceding them. All the loco pilots had followed different speeds while passing the defective signals that morning.
Because of the wrong authority letter, it "created an impression in the mind of the loco pilot that all defective signals can be passed at the maximum permissible speed of the section," the report says, adding, "There was no permanent or temporary speed restriction in force in the vicinity on the day of the accident." The maximum permissible speed in the section between Rangapani and Chatterhat stations is 110kmph.
The report also found fault in the manner in which the signalling failure was handled. It says that the control office at the divisional level has to be manned by one senior section engineer, one junior engineer and one helper round-the-clock in an eight-hour shift. However, on the night of June 16 and June 17, the signalling control office had been manned by a technician. "It is not possible to manage such a major signalling failure by a staff of technician level. The response of higher officials of the signalling department at the divisional level posted at Katihar has been found lackluster as despite being informed about this serious failure, none of them went to the control office to manage and coordinate with other departments for timely attention of signalling failures," the report mentions.
Since the automatic signalling was introduced in the Katihar division in Jan 2023, there have been 275 signalling failures.
The report also notes the "widespread" confusion regarding rules applicable during failure of automatic signalling and said it was "necessary that all rules applicable to automatic signalling are implemented at the field level. The widespread misinterpretation of rules indicates there was no system of checks and balances at the headquarter level".
Garg also recommended implementation of the automatic train protection system (Kavach) on top priority.